The 2009 £500 PRIZE for
the best response to this question in under 2,500 words by a student in
the UK was won by
ALEXANDER CAGAN of St Catharine's college, Cambridge
Sponsored by Eildon Press
WINNING ENTRY
"The issue: the idea that human
evolution was triggered by an aquatic phase is widely supported and
discussed outside the mainstream of paleoanthropology, but is
dismissed by most scientists working in the field.
How do we determine what models are reasonable and
plausible, and which ones are worthy of serious scientific study?"
"The men of experiment are
like the ant, they only collect and use; the reasoners resemble
spiders, who make cobwebs out of their own substance. But the bee
takes the middle course: it gathers its material from the flowers of
the garden and field, but transforms and digests it by a power of its
own. Not unlike this is the true business of philosophy (science)"
(Francis Bacon 1620).
Everybody likes a good story
and, in the case of human evolution, many people expect one. The
potential and the temptation for narrative-driven story-telling is,
perhaps, nowhere greater than in the field of human evolution. Origin
myths would appear to be a universal of all human societies and those
who seek to study and better understand human evolution must be
careful not to end up telling such stories themselves, equally
speculative but given credibility by a thin veil of pseudoscience. The
only way to gain true knowledge about human evolution is through
rigorous use of the scientific method. This involves the formulation
of hypotheses that can be repeatedly tested and falsified, using
evidence that is both empirical and observable. For a model to be
worthy of serious scientific study it must meet these criteria,
otherwise it is in danger of becoming another example of what Stanford
and Allen (1991) call "strategic storytelling"; these are
models which appear to be driven by sound scientific principles but
which are in fact un-testable and therefore not truly scientific.
However, this is bound to be difficult because the study of human
evolution is not aimed primarily at discovering underlying
evolutionary principles that can be tested. The study of human
evolution requires a further step in which we use such principles in
order to understand, as fully as possible, what actually happened to
our ancestors (and non-ancestors!) in the past. As our ancestors and
the environments in which they evolved no longer exist we must use
indirect means to determine all the whats, whens, wheres, hows  and
whys of our evolution. The scarce indirect evidence that survives in
the form of fossils, archaeological remains and genetics provide
invaluable insights into human evolution, but evidence alone is silent
and is given meaning only through the context of the models we create.
There are many ways that models concerning human evolution can be
constructed, and by discussing the potential and the pitfalls of
different types of models, it will become apparent that whatever
approach a model takes it must be based on the principles of the
scientific method for it to be worthy of serious study.
First and foremost models of
human evolution must be rooted in a paradigm of evolutionary theory.
Evolutionary theory provides the only scientific paradigm for
understanding the change of natural organisms through time. However,
to accurately apply evolutionary theory to human evolution it would,
at first, seem necessary to know what our human ancestors and the
environment in which they existed was like, and how they interacted
with and within this environment. It appears to be a chicken-and-egg
situation. Fortunately, because evolutionary theory is based on simple
and constant principles, it is possible to extrapolate theories gained
from the observation of other extant species and create models, which
can then be applied to human evolution. This theory of
uniformitarianism, which assumes that natural processes operating
today are identical to those that operated in the past, is what allows
us to create evolutionary models of human evolution, indeed it was
this theory of uniformitarianism, developed by Charles Lyell (1830),
which in part inspired Darwin to develop his theory of evolution by
natural selection.
The ways
that evolutionary theory is incorporated into models of human
evolution can be either direct or indirect. Explicitly conceptual
models take as their basis pure evolutionary theory and then attempt
to use logical steps to conclude how such theory would have affected
our ancestors. An example of this is the theory of anisogamy, which
has been used to explain sexual dimorphism and mating strategies in
sexually reproducing organisms. The theory goes that as female gametes
(eggs) are rarer and more expensive to produce than male gametes
(sperm), females should be more choosey about who they mate with as
fertilisations that do not result in offspring who survive to
reproduce are evolutionarily very costly, while males should mate with
whoever they can as such mistakes are relatively inexpensive for them.
This then results in sexual selection and sexual dimorphism as the
males are selected for their ability to compete for females (usually
through being the biggest and strongest) while females are selected
for their ability to choose the best mates (Mayr 2001). Therefore, in
species where males have most to gain by being competitive, such as
polygynous species, we can expect to see a high degree of sexual
dimorphism, while in species where the evolutionary stakes are lower
so to is the extent of sexual dimorphism. Using this theoretical
framework evolutionary anthropologists have attempted to model the
reproductive systems of extinct hominins (Reno et
al 2005).
While many
see the direct and logical use of evolutionary theory in such
non-referential models as a source of strength; arguing that they are
not obscured by the smoky lens of unsuitable homologies and analogies,
such a reliance on theory can also cause major problems. Although
evolution is based on simple principles in
reality it can be incredibly complicated and simple logical sequences
often fail to take into account external factors that have not been
considered. For instance the theory of anisogamy and its "logical
consequence" of sexual dimorphism reflecting the mating system
was initially interpreted as predicting that species with no marked
sexual dimorphism would be monogamous. However, this has been
questioned due to observational data of genera such as the gibbons,
which have almost no sexual dimorphism but are not fully monogamous,
with some groups being multi-male and many instances of extra pair
copulations being observed (Barelli et al
2008). Revelations such as these are the result of observational data
and show the inadequacy of theory alone in modelling human evolution.
Referential modelling should not be seen as a necessary evil due to
our lack of a direct window onto human evolution but as an opportunity
to strengthen our understanding of the evolutionary theory on which
models of human evolution are based and therefore stimulating new
avenues of research. That said, for referential models to be of use
they must use a relevant reference point. For example, if we were to
try and model the origins of tool-use in early hominins it would
probably be wiser to choose the tool-using Pan
troglodytes rather
than the non-tool using (in the wild) Pan
paniscus as our referential model, although
both are of equal degrees of relatedness to modern humans. Referential
models can be based on a variety of factors, from phylogeny, where we
use our closest living relatives, to ecological similarity, where we
chose a species based on it sharing a similar environment to our
ancestors. Therefore it is wrong to say that a referential model based
on human hunter-gatherers is always better than one based on baboons
simply because the human model is clearly more homologous. The
relevance of a referential model depends on the specific question
being asked.
While all models considered
worthy of serious scientific study should integrate evolutionary
theory with appropriate use of referential models they must also be
capable of generating hypotheses that can be empirically tested and
falsified. This ability to generate testable hypotheses is probably
the key distinction between credible and non-credible models of human
evolution. Many theories of human evolution that have gained
popularity, such as the aquatic ape hypothesis (Hardy 1960, Morgan
1999) are almost impossible to falsify (Langdon 1997). The aquatic ape
hypothesis is one of many models of human evolution popular among
non-anthropologists, which relies on a single causal force, in this
case our ancestors spending a brief period adapting to a littoral
environment, to explain the majority of consequences in human
evolution. Such models may artificially appear to be the most
parsimonious theories of human evolution because a misunderstanding of
the principle of Occam's razor leads people into believing that a
model that can explain all of human evolution using only one cause is
more likely to be correct than explanations of human evolution which
resort to using multiple models to explain multiple factors. In
reality an umbrella hypothesis that appears to be parsimonious in its
explanation of multiple factors is in fact not parsimonious at all if
it cannot be subjected to empirical testing and potentially falsified.
From what we do know of human evolution it is exceedingly unlikely
that single causal factors have such a wide scope for explanation, as
the evidence we have suggests that human evolution was a mosaic
process, both spatially and temporally. For example Langdon (1997) has
shown that a range of separate causes, which are more amenable to the
scientific method, can actually better explain most of the
consequences explained by the aquatic apes hypothesis.
The scientific reality of
the study of human evolution is not as immediately attractive as
umbrella models because it does not easily take the form of a cohesive
story. Progress in the study of human evolution depends on well
thought out theories based on the study of what we have available to
us in the present, namely referential models, which can be broken down
into testable hypotheses. We need evolutionary theory to know which
referential model is most relevant to use and we need referential
models to help develop and refine evolutionary theory and to alert us
to the diverse possible outcomes of evolution, which we alone would
have difficulty imagining. We must both widen our eyes and focus our
minds. While broader models have more appeal, it is the more specific
and empirical ones with testable assumptions that will stimulate
research and therefore further our knowledge and the discipline.
REFERENCES
Bacon, F. (1620) The
New Organon. Cambridge UP.
Barelli, C, Heistermann M.,
Boesch, C., Reichard, U.H. (2008) Mating patterns and sexual
swellings in pair-living and multi-male
groups of wild white-handed gibbons, Hylobates
lar. Animal
Behaviour 75:991-1001.
Hardy, A. (1960) Was man more
aquatic in the past? New Scientist 7:
642-645.
Langdon, J.H. (1997) Umbrella
hypotheses and parsimony in human evolution: A critique of the
Aquatic Apes Hypothesis. Journal
of Human Evolution, 33:479-494.
Lyell, C. (1830) Principles
of Geology. John Murray, Albemarle-Street.
Mayr, E. Â (2001) What
Evolution Is. London: Phoenix.
Morgan, E. (1999). The
Aquatic Ape Hypothesis. Souvenir Press.
Reno, P.L. et
al. (2005) The case is unchanged and remains
robust: Australopithecus afarensis
exhibits on moderate skeletal dimorphism. Journal
of Human Evolution,
48:279-288.
Stanford, C.B. & Allen, J.S.
(1991) On strategic storytelling: Current models of human
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